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Articles I1 and I11 of The Uniform Probate Code 
As Enacted in Utah 
Comment 
The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) is the result of 7 years' 
work' by some of the most experienced probate attorneys in the 
~ o u n t r y . ~  In 1969, the UPC was approved by both the American 
Bar Association and the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws, who had jointly directed the creation of 
the UPC.3 In using the UPC, state legislatures are now able to 
make large-scale improvements in their probate law that would 
be extremely difficult to make if undertaken piecemeal. By 
adopting the UPC in 1975,' Utah joined the small number of 
states5 that have availed themselves of the advantages of the 
UPC. Although the Utah version of the UPC, the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code (UUPC) ,"greatly improves and modernizes Utah's 
probate law, it embodies many departures from the UPC. 
The objectives of the UPC are to simplify and clarify inheri- 
tance laws and related matters, to give effect to the intent of the 
decedent, and to provide versatility and efficiency in distributing 
the decedent's estate.' Simplicity and clarity in the law are pro- 
moted both by modifying traditional common law approaches 
and by making uniform the laws of the various jurisdictions. Uni- 
formity, then, is an important policy of the UPC. It appears, 
1. The Uniform Probate Code was begun in 1962 and finally approved in 1969. Well- 
man, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN. L. REV. 453 
(1970). 
2. 8 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 282-85 (1972). 
3. Id. a t  281 (historical note). 
4. The Utah Uniform Probate Code was passed by the Utah legislature on March 13, 
1975, to become effective July 1, 1977. Utah Uniform Probate Code ch. 150, 8 75. [I9751 
Utah Laws 714. 
5. The states that have adopted the UPC in some form are, with their effective dates: 
Alaska (January 1, 1973); Arizona (January 1, 1974); Colorado (July 1, 1974); Florida 
(July 1, 1975); Idaho (July 1,1972); Minnesota (August 1, 1975); Montana (July 1, 1975); 
Nebraska (July 1, 1977); New Mexico (July 1, 1976); North Dakota (July 1, 1975); and 
South Dakota (July 1, 1975). 8 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 54 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. 8 
32A-1-101, note (Supp. 1975). 
6. Utah Uniform Probate Code ch. 150, 8 75, [I9751 Utah Laws 579-715 (effective 
July 1, 1977) [hereinafter cited as UUPC]. 
7. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b) [hereinafter cited as UPC]. See Rollison, 
Commentary On The Uniform Probate Code, 29 ALA. LAWYER 427, 428 (1968); Curry, 
Intestate Succession and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of Article 11 of the Uniform 
Probate Code and the Law of Ohio, 34 OHIO S.L.J. 114 (1973). 
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however, that the aim of the UPC to achieve national uniformity 
of probate law8 will not be completely achieved. Unlike the Uni- 
form Commercial Code, which was drafted to make the law con- 
form to existing business practices and  custom^,^ the UPC at- 
tempts to simplify many aspects of probate law by changing tra- 
ditional practices. As a result, the UPC has met resistance; the 
states that have considered it have either adopted it with many 
changes or have refused to adopt i t  a t  all.1° 
The draftsmen recognized that on some issues deviation from 
the UPC format might be justified by the particular needs of a 
jurisdiction." Two studies, one by the Utah State Bar Association 
and the other by the Utah legislature, were conducted to deter- 
mine if the UPC would meet the needs of Utah residents and to 
formulate any necessary modifications. Working from both stud- 
ies and with the aid of independent counsel, the Government 
Operations Committee of the Legislative Council drafted the 
UUPC. The original UUPC draft modified 90 of the 310 UPC 
sections, eliminated 6, and added 12 new sections.12 The UUPC 
was further amended while before the Utah legislature. Despite 
these changes, the UUPC, although not perfectly uniform with 
the UPC, retains much of the versatility and simplicity of the 
UPC policies and format. 
This comment will compare the material differences between 
articles I1 and I11 of the UUPC and the corresponding sections of 
the UPC. The comparison will follow the organization of the UPC 
so that the reader can more easily locate material in which he 
may have a particular interest.13 
8. UPC 91-102(5); UUPC § 75-1-102(5). 
9. Gilmore, Article 9: What I t  Does for the Past, 26 LA. L. REV. 285, 294 (1966). 
10. California rejected the UPC as not constituting an improvement over existing 
law. THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE: ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 
23 (March 1973). For a comparison of the alterations made by the various states that have 
enacted UPC art. I1 see Wellman, Uniformity In State Inheritance Laws: How UPC 
Article II Has Fared In Nine Enactments, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 357. Alaska and North 
Dakota passed the UPC substantially intact. ALASKA STAT. 5 13 (1972); N.D. CENT. CODE 
5 30.1 (Spec. Uniform Probate Code Supp. 1975). New Jersey has substantially adopted 
UPC $ 5  2-110, 5-501, -502. 8 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 54 (Supp. 1975). 
11. All bracketed language of the UPC was intended to be only suggestive, optional, 
or easily omitted. UPC 9 2-803, Comment; see, e.g., UPC § 2-102, -102A, -401A, -803. 
12. Giles & Miller, A Synopsis of the Utah Uniform Probate Code (Dec. 1974) (un- 
published report on file a t  the office of the Utah State Bar). 
13. UPC art. 11, pt. 7, dealing with contractual arrangements relating to death, and 
pt. 9, pertaining to the custody or deposit of wills, have been enacted in Utah without 
substantial change. Therefore, they are not treated by this comment. The same is true of 
art. 111, pts. 2, 4, 5, 11. 
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Article 11, dealing with intestate succession and wills, and 
article III, dealing with probate of wills and administration, con- 
tain the heart of the UPC. Ideally, alterations embodied in the 
UUPC should not frustrate the policies of the UPC; rather, they 
should promote the UPC policies of simplifying and clarifying 
probate law, giving effect to the intent of a decedent, and promot- 
ing speed and efficiency in distributing the estate of a decedent. 
Of course, changes suited to the particular needs of Utah resi- 
dents are encouraged; alterations that unjustifiably perpetuate 
traditional approaches taken by previous law, however, are disap- 
proved. 
In several significant areas of article 11, the UUPC has fol- 
lowed prior Utah law rather than adopting the approach of the 
UPC. The motive for adhering to prior Utah law, however, gener- 
ally seems to be that of maintaining the status quo rather than a 
legitimate desire to improve the UPC or adapt it  to meet the 
needs of Utah residents. 
A. Part 1 -Intestate Succession 
Part 1 contains the rules that govern succession to the estate 
of a decedent who has not executed a will or whose will has been 
held invalid. This part, more than any other, adheres to prior 
Utah law. 
Section 2-103(1) of the UPC allocates the portion of the intes- 
tate estate not taken by a spouse 
to the issue of the decedent; if they are all of the same degree of 
kinship to the decedent they take equally, but if of unequal 
degree, then those of more remote degree take by representa- 
tion . . . . 14 
Under this section the children of the decedent take equally; any 
deceased child's issue take his share by representation. Represen- 
tation is defined by section 2-106: 
If representation is called for by this Code, the estate is 
divided into as many shares as there are surviving heirs in the 
nearest degree of kinship and deceased persons in the same 
degree who left issue who survive the decedent, each surviving 
heir in the nearest degree receiving one share and the share of 
14. UPC $ 2-103(1). 
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each deceased person in the same degree being divided among 
his issue in the same manner.15 
Thus, the approach of the UPC is to make the initial division of 
an estate in the decedent's first descending generation containing 
a living heir. For example, if all children of an intestate prede- 
cease him, his grandchildren take his estate in equal shares rather 
than dividing the estate a t  the level of the deceased children and 
giving each grandchild his share of the deceased child's share. 
Then, at  the level of initial distribution, any deceased heir's share 
will be apportioned among his issue by representation. The UPC 
approach gives the issue in the first generation with a survivor 
equal shares, rejecting the position that the principal division of 
an estate should be in the first generation regardless of whether 
it contains a living member. 
The UUPC, rather than accepting the UPC approach, has 
adopted the prior Utah descent provisions.16 Section 2-103(a) of 
the UUPC distributes the estate not taken by a spouse "to the 
issue of the decedent by representation." UUPC section 2-106 
then defines representation: 
If representation is called for by this code, the descendant 
or descendants of any deceased heir take the same share or right 
in the estate of another person that his parent would have taken 
if living." 
The result is that the UUPC first divides the estate into as  many 
shares as there are living children of the intestate and deceased 
children of the intestate with living issue. This division is made 
even if all the intestate's children have predeceased him, giving 
individual grandchildren unequal shares when the deceased chil- 
dren's families vary in size. 
There is no clear reason to reject the UPC approach in favor 
of one that discriminates between members of the same genera- 
tion. Any desire a decedent may have had to give equally to the 
ancestors of the first living generation is most likely gone when 
those ancestors are deceased. Moreover, awarding unequal shares 
to members of the first surviving generation could promote dis- 
harmony among family members. 
A further deficiency in the operation of UUPC section 2- 
103(a) arises since that section does not expressly provide for 
- 
15. UPC $ 2-106. 
16. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 74-4-23 (1953). 
17. UUPC $ 75-2-106. 
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equal division of the estate to the issue or the representatives of 
deceased issue of the same degree of relation to the intestate, as 
do both the UPCIR and prior Utah law.19 Rather, UUPC section 
2-103(a) directs only that the issue take by representation. This 
statutory deficiency creates a problem in light of Utah case law 
that holds succession to be "purely a matter of statutory regula- 
t i ~ n . " ~ ~  The case law does not provide that persons who take by 
representation must take equally. Thus, it is not clear that the 
intestate's estate is to be divided equally either among the issue 
and representatives of deceased issue a t  the first generation of 
distribution or among those taking any deceased issue's share by 
representation. This departure from the UPC, also a departure 
from Utah's prior position, is unjustified because i t  leaves the law 
ambiguous. 
Taken together, Utah's deviations from the UPC in sections 
2-103(a) and 2-106 introduce another ambiguity. UUPC section 
2-103(a) gives the part of the estate not passing to the spouse 
"[tlo the issue of the decedent by repre~en ta t ion . "~~  Under 
UUPC section 2-106, representation gives "the descendant or des- 
cendants of any deceased heir . . . the same share or right in the 
estate of another person that his parent would have taken if liv- 
ing."22 By the literal terms of these statutes, then, a child of the 
intestate would not be able to take a share of the estate since the 
intestate is not an heir of his own estate. Such a result, certainly 
not intended by the Utah legislature, would probably be avoided 
by the courts through the application of common law principles." 
It is unfortunate, however, that in such a common situation as 
distribution of an intestate estate to children of the decedent, the 
courts of Utah will have to look outside the code for the control- 
18. UPC § 2-103(a). 
19. UTAH CODE ANN. 4 74-4-5(2) (Supp. 1975) states, in pertinent part: 
If the decedent leaves no surviving husband or wife, but leaves issue, the 
whole estate goes to such issue, and if such issue consists of more than one child 
living, or one child living and the issue of one or more deceased children, then 
the estate goes in equal shares to the children living, or to the child living and 
the issue of the deceased child or children by right of representation. For pur- 
poses of this subsection, issue shall include adopted children. 
(emphasis added). 
20. In re Yonk's Estate, 115 Utah 292, 295, 204 P.2d 452, 454 (1949). 
21. UUPC 5 75-2-103(a). 
22. UUPC § 75-2-106 (emphasis added). 
23. By using the term "representation" to describe the distribution system by which 
the children of an intestate receive their intestate share, however, Utah courts must ignore 
the traditional view that the term connotes taking the share of an immediate ancestor who 
would have inherited if he had lived. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1465 (4th ed. rev. 1968). 
430 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
ling principle, especially since the code was intended to be a 
comprehensive treatment of probate problems. 
Section 2-103 of the UPC limits intestate succession to the 
decedent's grandparents and their descendants, eliminating more 
remote relatives.24 Section 2-105 causes the estate to escheat if no 
grandparents or lineal descendants of grandparents are alive to 
take by intestacy. The UUPC, adhering to former Utah law,25 
rejects the UPC approach by allowing any kin, however remote, 
to take by i n t e ~ t a c y . ~ ~  The UPC system reflects the modern think- 
ing that if the intestate had disposed of his property by will, he 
probably would not have included among his devisees the more 
remote relatives who take by intestate succession under many 
statutes now in e~istence.~' In addition, the UPC approach of 
limiting the relatives who may take a share of the estate is based 
on its policy to streamline and simplify probate.28 The increased 
costs of litigation and the delays caused by seeking out remote 
heirs or examining spurious claims29 inherent in the Utah system 
are avoided by the UPC approach. Furthermore, it is doubtful 
whether the Utah alteration better effectuates the decedent's in- 
tent than does the UPC. Especially in light of the added burden 
on administration caused by the UUPC approach, decedents 
likely would prefer escheat for the benefit of the public or, under 
the UUPC, for the state school system30 over intestate succession 
to remote relatives. 
Section 2-110 of the UPC, governing advancements, requires 
a contemporaneous writing by the intestate or a written acknowl- 
edgment by the heir if an inter vivos gift to the heir is to be 
considered part of the heir's share of the estate. In contrast, the 
UUPC does not require that the decedent's writing be contempor- 
aneous with the gift. The recipient of such a gift, therefore, can- 
not be certain if it constitutes an advancement until the death of 
the donor. Further, since the donor may change the character of 
the gift until death, claims of undue influence may be more fre- 
quent. The simplicity and certainty of requiring the writing to be 
contemporaneous with the gift seem preferable, especially since 
24. UPC $ 2-103, Comment. 
25. UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-4-5(6) (1953). 
26. UUPC $ 75-2-103(e). 
27. UPC $ 2-103, Comment; Rollison, supra note 7, at 428-29. 
28. See note 7 and accompanying test supra. 
29. See Rollison, supra note 7, at 429. 
30. UUPC § 75-2-105 earmarks escheated intestate estates for the benefit of the state 
school fund. 
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the donor can still change the effect of the writing by executing a 
subsequent will. 
The UPC also provides that the advancement does not re- 
duce the shares of the recipient's issue, should the recipient pre- 
decease the intestate, unless the writing states otherwi~e.~' The 
UUPC takes the opposite approach, presuming that the advance- 
ment reduces the share to be distributed to the recipient's issue 
unless the writing provides otherwise.32 The succeeding language 
of the UUPC33 makes i t  clear that the Utah change was inten- 
tional. It does not, however, explain the contradictory positions 
taken with respect to the heir and his issue. Under the Utah 
approach, if the heir survives the intestate, the heir's issue stand 
to eventually receive both the value of the gift to the heir and the 
full intestate share received by the heir. If the heir predeceases 
the intestate, however, the heir's issue will receive only the intes- 
tate share of the heir reduced by the value of the gift. Why the 
UUPC takes the position that a lifetime gift to an heir is pre- 
sumed not to be an advancement, but such a gift is treated as if 
it were an advancement to the issue of the heir if the heir prede- 
ceases the intestate, is not clear. 
B. Part 2-Elective Share of Surviving Spouse 
Both codes provide that the elective share of the surviving 
spouse shall be one-third of the augmented estate as defined in 
section 2-202. The augmented estate concept is designed to pro- 
tect both the estate and the surviving spouse by ensuring the 
surviving spouse a fair share, but only a fair share, of the dece- 
dent's property. This is accomplished by adding to the probate 
estate of the decedent: (1) certain property that he has trans- 
ferred to persons other than the surviving spouse during the mar- 
riage, to the extent that he received less than full c~ns ide ra t ion ;~~  
(2) the value of the surviving spouse's property derived from the 
intestate for less than full consideration; and (3) any transfers of 
such property made by the spouse during the marriage for less 
than full  ons side ration.^^ 
- -- 
31. UPC $ 2-110. 
32. UUPC § 75-2-110. 
33. The last sentence of UUPC 6 75-2-110 states: 
"If the amount of the advancement exceeds the share of the heir receiving the same, 
he is not required, however, to refund any part of the advancement." 
34. UPC g 2-202(1). 
35. UPC g 2-202(2). 
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The UUPC, however, adds a new subsection to the definition 
of the augmented estate that substantially restricts the category 
of property includable in the augmented estate: 
The augmented estate includes only property and transfers 
thereof acquired by the deceased spouse during marriage to the 
surviving spouse other than by gift, devise or descent or the 
increase, rents, issues and profits from this property and on 
property owned prior to marriage.36 
There might be some justification for this alteration. Since the 
UPC exempts from the augmented estate property acquired be- 
fore marriage by the surviving spouse, it does not seem inconsist- 
ent to exempt all property that comes as a windfall to the mar- 
riage. On the other hand, by exempting the rents and profits 
derived from pre-marriage property from the augmented estate, 
the UUPC may substantially reduce the amount available to a 
surviving spouse taking the elective share. Since the rents and 
profits on such property were earned during the marriage, it is 
reasonable to include them in the augmented estate for the pur- 
pose of computing the elective share. Although the impact of this 
section will not affect all estates equally, it is clear that in many 
situations it will reduce the advantages of the elective share rem- 
edy. 
Section 2-205 of the UUPC allows the surviving spouse a 
longer period to petition for the elective share than is allowed by 
the corresponding section of the UPC. The UPC allows the surviv- 
ing spouse 6 months following the publication of notice to credi- 
tors to take the elective share. In most cases, this confines the 
election to the period preceding the final probate of the will. In 
contrast, the UUPC allows the election to be made within 1 year 
after the date of death or within 6 months following the probate 
of the decedent's will, whichever expires last.37 The longer time 
period is unnecessary. A surviving spouse has sufficient time 
under the limit established by the UPC to determine the advan- 
tage of taking under the will as opposed to electing one-third of 
the augmented estate. Although the UUPC extension allows the 
spouse to "wait and see" how the economy affects the various 
assets of the estate, an election after final probate could generate 
considerable expense, thereby reducing the estate further. The 
objective of the UPC to minimize legal costs and streamline pro- 
36. UUPC § 75-2-202(2 ). 
37. UUPC 9 75-2-205(1). 
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bate is hindered by extending the time available for election. 
Section 2-206(b) of the UPC requires that if the will has 
clearly provided gifts in lieu of the spouse's homestead allowance, 
exempt property allowance, or family allowance, the spouse is not 
entitled to these allowances unless the related gifts under the will 
are renounced. The UUPC eliminates this restriction, allowing 
the spouse these statutory benefits regardless of whether or not 
the spouse renounces any gifts in the The elective share, the 
homestead allowance, and other statutory benefits are limits on 
a testator's power to disinherit his spouse and children, and on 
creditors' power to reach the estate in satisfaction of their claims. 
When the testator wishes to disinherit the spouse, UPC section 
2-206(b) gives as much effect to the testor's intent to disinherit 
as public policy allows. The statutory limitations, however, are 
unnecessary to the extent that the spouse and children have been 
provided for in the will. Although a spouse can always frustrate 
the decedent's intent by taking an elective share, there appears 
to be no sound reason to permit the spouse to take property that  
exceeds both the testator's intent and the statutory protections. 
Such is the effect of the UUPC modification. 
C. Part 3-Spouse and Children Unprovided for in  Wills 
Part 3 gives the spouse and children omitted from the will 
the same share they would have received had the decedent died 
intestate unless either the will indicates that the omission was 
intentional or other requirements are met. These other require- 
ments are the same for the omitted spouse in both codes,39 but  
are different for the omitted children.40 Section 2-303(2) of the 
UUPC, in conformity with the UPC, requires that to disinherit 
any child, it is necessary (1) that it appear from the will that the 
omission was intentional; (2) that the bulk of the estate be given 
to the surviving parent of the omitted child; or (3) that inter 
vivos gifts have been given in lieu of a testamentary p r o ~ i s i o n . ~ ~  
The UPC provides that the section applies only to children born 
or adopted after the execution of the will; the UUPC, however, 
contains no such restriction. The UUPC, then, requires the testa- 
tor to satisfy one of the above requirements in order to disinherit 
even children born or adopted before the execution of the will. 
38. UUPC § 75-2-206. 
39. UPC 2-301; UUPC § 75-2-301. 
40. UPC § 2-302(a); UUPC 9 75-2-302(1). 
41. UUPC $ 9  75-2-302(1)(a) to ( c ) .  
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The UPC provision is based on the presumption that if the testa- 
tor failed to mention a child born or adopted prior to the execu- 
tion of the will, he intended to disinherit him. This presumption 
seems consonant with the intent of the testator. If the testator 
failed to mention a living child in his will, it is likely that he 
intended to disinherit him. The UUPC approach, however, may 
be justifiable as insurance against an unintentional omission by 
the testator. 
Compounding the problems of section 2-302, the UUPC adds 
that if the issue of a deceased child of the testator are not pro- 
vided for in the will and the omission does not fit within the 
exceptions of section 2-302, such issue of the deceased child take 
the intestate share of the deceased child despite their omission 
from the will. This addition requires the testator to anticipate in 
his estate plan the death of each child if he intends to disinherit 
the child's issue. It also creates an ambiguity. A literal interpreta- 
tion of language of UUPC section 2-302 would allow the issue of 
a deceased child not only an intestate share of the estate if they 
were pretermitted from the will, but also their shares of the de- 
ceased child's testamentary gifts if he were not ~retermitted. '~ In
all probability the drafters of the UUPC did not intend this re- 
sult. Consequently, an amendment is necessary to make the right 
of a deceased child's issue to take an intestate share under this 
section dependent upon the pretermission of the deceased child. 
D. Part 4-Exempt Property and Allowances 
Part 4 of the UPC describes certain rights to which a surviv- 
ing spouse and children of a decedent are entitled that are supe- 
rior to claims against the estate. I t  provides that the homestead 
all~wance, '~ exempt property allowance,44 and family allowance45 
have priority over all other claims against the estate. If the estate 
42. This result is specifically allowed by the antilapse provisions of the UUPC: 
If a devisee who is an heir of the testator is dead a t  the time of execution of 
the will, fails to survive the testator, or is treated as if he predeceased the 
testator, the issue of the deceased devisee who survive the testator by 120 hours 
take in place of the deceased devisee by representation. One who would have 
been a devisee under a class gift if he had survived the testator is treated as a 
devisee for purposes of this section whether his death occurred before or after 
the execution of the will. 
UUPC 5 75-2-605. 
43. UPC § 2-401. 
44. UPC 5 2-402. 
45. UPC § 2-403. 
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is insufficient to satisfy all three allowances, it is applied first to 
the homestead allowance, then to the family allowance, and fi- 
nally to the exempt property a l l o w a n ~ e . ~ ~  
The UUPC makes two significant changes in this part by 
incorporating the homestead allowance as defined by prior Utah 
law," and by providing that reasonable funeral expenses take 
priority over all claims except the homestead a l l o ~ a n c e . ~ ~  The 
Utah homestead provisions require that the decedent have a real 
property interest from which the allowance can be satisfied. If he 
has no real property, the surviving spouse may claim no home- 
stead allowance.49 In contrast, the UPC recognizes that since own- 
ership of land is not as universal as it once was, it is necessary to 
allow a cash equivalent of the homestead allowance in order to 
adequately protect some surviving spouses. Thus, Utah's adher- 
ence to the traditional approach fails to protect the survivors of 
Utah residents who have no interest in real property. Giving 
priority to funeral bills over claims of other creditors and the 
rights of the surviving spouse and children is inconsistent with 
the UPC approach that treats creditors equally and guarantees 
a t  least part of the estate to the widow and children. 
E. Part 5- Wills 
The UPC policy of providing flexibility and simplicity is evi- 
denced in part 5, which governs the rules for the execution and 
construction of wills. By adhering to prior law, however, Utah has 
retained much of the rigidity the UPC attempts to avoid. For 
example, section 2-502 of both codes requires the witnesses to a 
will to: (1) observe the signing of the will by the testator; (2) re- 
46. UPC §§  2-402, -403. 
47. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 28-1-1 (Supp. 1975) provides the homestead allowance in 
Utah: 
A homestead consisting of lands, appurtenances and improvements, which 
lands may be in one or more localities, not exceeding in value with the appurte- 
nances and improvements thereon the sum of $4,000 for the head of the family, 
and the further sum of $1,500 for the spouse, and $600 for each other members 
of the family, shall be exempt from judgment lien and from execution or forced 
sale, except upon the following obligations: (1) taxes accruing and levied 
thereon; (2) judgments obtained on debts secured by lawful mortgage on the 
premises and on debts created for the purchase price thereof; and (3) judgments 
obtained by an appropriate party on debts created by failure to provide support 
or maintenance for dependent children. 
48. See UUPC §§  75-2-401 to -403. 
49. See, e.g., Rich Coop. Ass'n v. Dustin, 14 Utah 2d 408, 385 P.2d 155 (1963); 
Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 206, 69 P.2d 614, 619 (1937). 
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ceive acknowledgment by the testator that the signature on the 
will is his; or (3) receive an acknowledgment by the testator that 
the will is hi~.~Vl?he UUPC further requires that "[tlhe signing 
by the witnesses must be in the testator's presence and in the 
presence of each other."51 This is the traditional rule in Utah.52 
Unfortunately, its reenactment frustrates the UPC attempt to 
simplify the process of execution by allowing each signature to a 
will to be an isolated event. 
The UPC approach is superior. Where the witnesses know 
that the will is the testator's, as they must under the require- 
ments of section 2-502, the fact that they do not sign the will in 
the presence of the testator or in the presence of each other should 
not invalidate the will. Situations such as the illness of the testa- 
tor may well indicate that the prudent course of action would be 
to allow mere formalities to be completed in a method more suit- 
able to the circumstance-that is, out of his presence. The little 
additional protection from fraud that these formalities provide 
fails to justify the frustration of the testator's wishes when the 
will is held invalid because of a mere defective formality in execu- 
tion. It is even questionable whether this formality will prevent 
fraud since those who perpetrate fraud would be careful to com- 
ply with the technical formalities of will execution.53 
Section 2-505 of the UUPC is more restrictive than its UPC 
counterpart as to who may qualify as a witness to a will. The UPC 
states that "[alny person generally competent to be a witness 
may act as a witness to a will."54 It expressly rejects any penalties 
for the use of an interested witness.55 The UUPC, on the other 
hand, requires that a witness be 18 years of age or olderS6 and 
provides that a witness who is a beneficiary of the will is limited 
in the amount he may take under the will to the equivalent of his 
intestate share.57 The UPC approach is more consistent with the 
policies of promoting simplicity and giving effect to the testator's 
intent. Although it would be rare that an attorney would use a 
person under the age of 18 or an interested party as a witness, 
such practices occasionally occur either out of necessity or igno- 
50. UPC 5 2-502; UUPC § 75-2-502. 
51. UUPC 5 75-2-502. 
52. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 74:l-5 (1953). 
53. UPC 5 2-505, Comment. 
54. UPC 5 2-505. 
55. UPC 5 2-505(b). 
56. UUPC $ 75-2-505(1). 
57. UUPC 75-2-505(2). 
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rance. These UUPC restrictions on the competency of witnesses 
fail to materially reduce the possibility of fraud58 and may unnec- 
essarily invalidate wills. 
Another important difference between the UUPC and the 
UPC is the approach taken toward holographic wills. UUPC sec- 
tion 2-503, again incorporating prior Utah law," states that "[a] 
will . . . is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, 
if the signature and the provisions are in the handwriting of the 
testator."" The UPC, however, requires only that the "material" 
provisions be in the handwriting of the testator. Under the UPC's 
requirement that only the material provisions and the signature 
be in the testator's handwriting, a judge can ignore nondispositive 
printed, stamped, or typed language in the document, and permit 
the use of some will forms." The UUPC again adopts an inflexible 
approach that burdens both testator and judiciary. Invalidating 
a holographic will for such a minor detail as having the date or 
introductory language printed, stamped, or typed is unnecessar- 
ily harsh. 
As a precautionary feature, UUPC section 2-503 adds that if 
several holographic wills with "conflicting provisions" exist, a 
proferred will, to be valid, "must be dated or circumstances exist 
that establish which will was last e x e c ~ t e d . " ~ ~  This addition ap- 
pears to add little to the UPC since any time more than one will 
is offered as controlling the disposition of a testator's property, 
evidence must be adduced as to which is valid. This feature of 
UUPC section 2-503 should not be read to preclude courts from 
giving effect to all offered wills to the extent that their provisions 
are not inconsistent when no will can be proven to have been the 
last executed.63 
UUPC section 2-508, in addition to making divorce effective 
as a revocation of the disposition in a prior will to the divorced 
spouse (as does the UPC), also makes the divorce effective as a 
revocation of dispositions to the issue of the divorced spouse who 
are not also issue of the testator. This addition appears consistent 
with the policy of the UPC to give effect to the intent of the 
decedent and thus represents an improvement on the UPC. 
58. See note 53 and accompanying text supra. 
59. UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-1-6 (1953). 
60. UUPC 75-2-503. 
61. UPC § 2-503, Comment. 
62. UUPC § 75-2-503. 
63. See In re Howard's Estate, 3 Utah 2d 76, 81, 278 P.2d 622, 625-26 (1955); UTAH 
CODE ANN. $ 5  74-1-22, 74-2-4 (1953); Annot., 51 A.L.R. 652, 663-64 (1927). 
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UUPC section 2-508 also defines divorce to include an interlocu- 
tory decree entered by a court.64 Possible ambiguities are thus 
avoided, and the intent of the testator is more probably fulfilled. 
Consequently, Utah's alterations of section 2-508 are more com- 
patible with the policies of the UPC than is the UPC itself. 
UPC section 2-513 allows a will to refer to a separate writing 
listing dispositions of tangible personal property not disposed of 
in the will. Since the list may be altered by the testator without 
the formalities of will execution, expense and other problems as- 
sociated with the amendment of a will can be avoided. The UUPC 
adopts this provision, but modifies it slightly by requiring that if 
several such lists containing conflicting provisions exist, "the 
writing to be given effect must be dated or circumstances exist 
that establish which writing is the most recent."65 As discussed 
previously, since the court must determine this issue using the 
same type of evidence under the UPC,66 Utah's change adds little. 
F. Part 6-Rules of Construction 
Both the UPC and the UUPC provide that, absent a contrary 
express provision in the will, if a devisee fails to survive the testa- 
tor by 120 hours, he is deemed to have predeceased the testatorae7 
The effect of this provision is to avoid double taxation of the 
estate and to ensure that the testator's property descends through 
the testator rather than through the devisee. The UUPC adds a 
presumption that a devisee failed to survive the testator if it 
cannot be proven that he survived by 120 hours.6R This is merely 
an incorporation of the concept of the Simultaneous Death 
which presumes survival where the time of death is uncertain. 
The UUPC concept dovetails nicely with the 120-hour approach 
of the UPC, and is compatible with UPC policies. 
UPC section 2-602 allows the testator to choose the law 
applicable to any provision of the will unless the effect would be 
contrary to the public policy of the jurisdiction deciding the issue. 
The UUPC, by requiring further that the designated law not con- 
flict with the provisions of the spouse's elective share or the statu- 
64. The section provides, in pertinent part: "For purposes of this section, divorce or 
annulment has reference to the interlocutory decree entered by the court . . . ." UUPC 
8 75-2-508. 
65. UUPC $ 75-2-513. 
66. See note 62 and accompanying text supra. 
67. UPC 2-601; UUPC 8 75-2-601. 
68. UUPC 8 75-2-601(2). 
69. 8 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 605 (1972). See note 79 and accompanying text infra. 
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tory benefits of part 4,70 only makes express what could have been 
accomplished under the original UPC section. If Utah public pol- 
icy with respect to the treatment of the surviving spouse is re- 
flected by the rules governing the elective share and other bene- 
fits, then foreign law chosen by the testator could not preempt the 
statutory provisions even in the absence of Utah's express modifi- 
cation to the UPC. 
Section 2-611 of the UUPC omits the following italicized lan- 
guage from the UPC: 
Halfbloods, adopted persons, and persons born out of wedlock 
are included in class gift terminology and terms of relationship 
in accordance with rules for determining relationship for pur- 
poses of intestate succession, but a person born out of wedlock 
is not treated as the  child of .the father unless the  person is 
openly and notoriously so treated by the  father.71 
Omission of this language permits an illegitimate child to claim 
a share of the estate even though the child was never recognized 
or supported by the decedent. As a result, Utah's version may 
encourage litigation. The lighter burden of proof required by Utah 
may encourage bona fide illegitimate children, usually prone to 
challenge distributions that ignore them,72 to claim against the 
will, and may even encourage imposters to make such claims. The 
danger of increased litigation, however, is arguably outweighed 
by the sound policy of placing illegitimate children on equal foot- 
ing with legitimate children for the purposes of class gifts, as has 
been done by the UPC in intestacy  question^.'^ 
UPC section 2-612 provides that gifts transferred to a devisee 
during the lifetime of the testator are applied toward satisfaction 
of his devise (ademption) only if the will so states in a contempor- 
aneous writing or the devisee acknowledges the same in writing. 
The UUPC, however, does not require that a writing by the testa- 
tor be contemporaneous with the gift. In Utah, a testator may 
make an inter vivos gift and then, at  any time before his death, 
decide that it is in satisfaction of the devise. While certainly a 
more flexible approach, this modification has undesirable effects. 
Transfers originally made as gifts, later to be transformed into 
70. UUPC 4 75-2-602. 
71. UPC § 2-611. 
72. See, e.g., In re Newell's Estate, 78 U tah  463, 5 P.2d 230 (1931). 
73. UPC § 2-109(2). See generally Note,  Uniform Probate Code-Illegitimacy- 
Inheritance and the  Illegitimate: A Mode for Probate Reform, 69 MICH.  L. REV. 112 
(1970); Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L. REV. 45 (1959). 
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satisfaction of a devise, could be a source of dissatisfaction lead- 
ing to litigation among the beneficiaries. The same result may be 
obtained under the UPC, however, if the testator complies with 
the formalities necessary to change his will. I t  is thought that the 
added required formalities are necessary to prevent changes moti- 
vated by a mere whim of the testator or by undue influence. 
G. Part 8-General Provisions 
Part 8 governs, among other things, the renunciation of a 
testamentary gift .74 The UUPC renumbers the sections that fol- 
low the renunciation rules and adds a new section.75 The purpose 
of Utah's added section (UUPC section 2-802) is to allow persons 
to disclaim transfers of a nontestamentary nature,?' thus ex- 
panding the group of interests that may be renounced. The sec- 
tion provides added flexibility in tax and estate planning by al- 
lowing a donee to renounce nontestamentary gifts that might 
have adverse tax effects on him or that might run counter to the 
decedent's wishes for some reason.'? Gifts made within 9 months 
of the decedent's death may figure significantly in the recipient's 
estate plan or the decedent's estate plan even though nontesta- 
mentary in nature. Nevertheless, the inclusion of renunciation 
provisions for nontestamentary transfers in the probate code 
seems out of place. 
The UUPC requires that such renunciations of nontestamen- 
tary gifts be filed within 9 months after the transfer is made or 9 
months after a person first learns of his interest in the gift or 
right.7R The renunciation rule for testamentary gifts, UUPC sec- 
tion 2-801, increases the period for renouncing a testamentary gift 
from 6 months, as provided by the UPC, to 9 months following 
the death of the testator or the ascertainment by the beneficiary. 
The reasons for allowing this extended time period are not clear. 
Since Utah's extension further delays the probate process, how- 
ever, the approach of the UPC seems preferable. 
74. UPC Q 2-801; UUPC Q 75-2-801. 
75. The UUPC added 5 75-2-802 (nontestamentary transfers), placing it after the 
renunciation rules in UPC Q 2-801 and before the rules governing the effect of divorce in 
Q 2-802 (UUPC 8 75-2-803). 
76. This section is substantially the same as the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers 
Under Nontestamentary Instruments Act. 8 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 23 (Supp. 1975). 
77. See generally Howe, Renunciation by the Heir, Devisee, or Legatee, 42 K Y .  L.J. 
605 (1954). 
78. UUPC § 75-2-802(2)(a). 
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H. Part 10-Simultaneous Death Provisions 
All of UUPC part 10 is an addition to the UPC. I t  
incorporates the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act79 into Utah's 
comprehensive treatment of probate problems. In general, its pro- 
visions provide the presumptions that control when the simulta- 
neous deaths of two persons leave the passage of property uncer- 
tain. If the order of death cannot be ascertained, the distributor 
is deemed to have survived the prospective distributee. The effect 
of the law can be avoided by an expression of contrary intent in 
the wilPO 
UUPC section 2-1002 introduces an  ambiguity that  may 
cause problems in the event of the simultaneous deaths of testa- 
tor and beneficiary. Section 2-601(2), as previously m e n t i ~ n e d , ~ ~  
creates the presumption that the beneficiary failed to survive the 
testator by 120 hours if it cannot be proven that the beneficiary 
survived by 120 hours. On the other hand, section 2-1002 pre- 
sumes that if there is no evidence that the beneficiary survived, 
he is deemed to have predeceased the testator. Thus, the cases 
covered by section 2-1002 are, for all practical purposes, sub- 
sumed within section 2-601(2). Section 2-1002 would be necessary 
only in the rare instance that the testator expressly rejected the 
120-hour survival requirement of section 2-601(1). In that case, 
the presumption of section 2-601(2) would not be sufficient to 
make a determination as to who died first, and the presumption 
of section 2-1002 would be needed. The two sections must be read 
as independent of each other, however, if double taxation and 
double administration of the same assets are to be avoided where 
the beneficiary dies less than 120 hours after the testator. 
Article 111, the administrative and procedural core of the 
Uniform Probate Code, provides a flexible system for administer- 
ing estates? It presumes that the judicial role in probate admin- 
istration should be passive until an interested person invokes the 
- - 
79. 8 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 605 (1972). Part 10 represents the reenactment of UTAH 
CODE ANN. $ 5  74-5-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975). 
80. UUPC $ 75-2-1006. 
81. See note 70 and accompanying text supra. 
82. UPC art. III, General Comment; Note, Flexibility, The Uniform Probate Code k 
Procedural Article, and Some Comparisons with Kentucky Statutes, 62 KY.  L.J. 1083, 
1084-85 (1974). See generally Peterson, Idaho's Uniform Probate Code: A Bird's Eye View, 
8 IDAHO L. REV. 289, 295-301 (1972). 
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court's jurisdiction to resolve a problem.u3 Although the UUPC 
generally adopts the approach of the UPC, chapter I11 of the 
UUPC substantively differs from article I11 of the UPC in approx- 
imately 30 areas. Although most of the changes are minoq8j some 
are substantial. 
A. Part 1 G e n e r a l  Provisions 
UUPC section 3-105 embodies the first deviation from UPC 
article III. Although section 3-106 has been deleted by the UUPC, 
most of its principles have been incorporated into UUPC section 
3-105. Section 3-105 of the UPC provides that the court,has exclu- 
sive jurisdiction in formal proceedings to administer and distrib- 
ute the estate. The court has concurrent jurisdiction of any other 
action in which the estate (through a personal representative) 
may be a party, including actions to determine title to property 
alleged to belong to the estate, and of any action in which prop- 
erty distributed by a personal representative is sought by credi- 
tors or other successors. UPC section 3-105 was designed to give 
the probate court "unlimited power to hear and finally dispose of 
all matters relevant to determination of the extent of the dece- 
dent's estate and of the claims against it? Utah omits the exclu- 
sive/concurrent jurisdiction distinction of UPC section 3-105, as 
suggested by the comment to UPC section 3-106, which provides 
an alternative provision for states having a single court of general 
jurisdiction. The term "court" is defined in UUPC section 1-201 
as the district court. A Utah district court is a court of general 
j~ r i sd ic t ion ;~~  hence, the court indicated by the UUPC would 
have the requisite jurisdiction to dispose of all matters relating 
to a decedent's estate. 
A second difference is found by comparing the statutes of 
limitation provided for probate proceedings. Both the UPC and 
the UUPC establish a 3-year statute of  limitation^.^' The UUPC, 
83. UPC art. 111, General Comment; Note, Flexibility, The Uniform Probate Code's 
Procedural Article and Some Comparisons with Kentucky Statutes, 62 K Y .  L.J. 1083, 
1086-87 (1974); see Robertson, The Uniform Probate Code: An Opportunity for Mississippi 
Lawyers to Better Serve the Weak and the Grieving, 45 MISS. L.J. 1, 5 (1974); Straus, Is 
the Uniform Probate Code the Answer?, 111 TRUSTS & ESTATES 870, 872 (1972). 
84. For example, under UUPC P 75-3-914, unclaimed assets escheat to the state 
school fund. The UPC provided that the funds would be distributed to the "state escheat 
fund"; however, the National Conference bracketed the term, indicating that deviation 
would be acceptable. UPC § 3-914 & Comment. 
85. UPC 9 3-105, Comment. 
86. UTAH CODE ANN. 4 78-3-4 (1953). 
87. UUPC 0 75-3-107(1); UPC 4 3-108. 
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however, provides a significant exception to the rule. UUPC sec- 
tion 3-107(d) states that an appointment proceeding, but not a 
formal testacy proceeding, may be commenced after the statute 
of limitations has expired if a personal representative has not 
been previously appointed. A personal representative appointed 
under this exception is then given the power to possess assets to 
the extent necessary to confirm title in the rightful successors, 
but claims other than administrative expenses may not be pre- 
sented against the estate.88 Thus, one who holds estate assets that 
have been distributed without the appointment of a personal rep- 
resentative can never be sure that his title to the assets is secure. 
At any time, regardless of the 3-year statute of limitations, a 
personal representative could be appointed. The personal repre- 
sentative could then repossess and redistribute the estate assets. 
Hence, in Utah the 3-year statute of limitations provides com- 
plete protection for only those estates in which a personal repre- 
sentative has been appointed. This deviation is contrary to the 
UPC's policy of allowing estates to be informally settled without 
probate where the successors so choose,8g and cannot be justified 
in light of the perpetual uncertainties that it creates. 
The last change contained in part 1 of the UUPC is found in 
section 3-109. Utah added this section to provide that where two 
or more unprobated estates have the same heirs, the court may 
grant letters of administration permitting joint administration of 
both estates.'O Although the UPC does not contain a comparable 
section, there is nothing in the code preventing the joint adminis- 
tration of separate estates. In any event, the Utah clarification is 
consistent with the UPC policy of simplifying and speeding the 
probate process. 
B. Part 3-Informal Probate and Appointment Proceedings 
Informal probate and appointment proceedings are com- 
menced by filing an application requesting the probate of a will 
or the appointment of a personal representative. Both the UUPC 
and the UPC require that notice of the application be given to any 
interested person demanding it.91 The UPC also requires that 120 
hours elapse after death before the registrars2 may issue a written 
88. UUPC § 75-3-107(1)(d). 
89. UUPC art. 111, General Comment. 
90. UUPC § 75-3-109 is identical to UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-4-6 (1953). 
91. UUPC 6 75-3-204; UPC 3-204. 
92. The UUPC defines the registrar as the district judge. UUPC § 75-1-201(36). The 
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statement of informal probate or appointment." The UUPC, 
however, eliminates the requirement that 120 hours elapse and 
substitutes a notice r e q ~ i r e m e n t . ~ ~  Pursuant to UUPC section 3- 
310, the clerk of the court must provide notice by mail to each 
heir or devisee 10 days prior to issuing the written statement of 
informal probate or appointment. This is a departure from the 
UPC, whose roots stem from non-notice English ecclesiastical 
l a ~ . ~ W o n - n o t i c e  probate, which assumes that death itself is suf- 
ficient notice to heirs and devisees that they should act to protect 
their interests in an estate, has worked well in New Jersey, Penn- 
sylvania, and Delaware for over 150 years.g6 
Although the Utah notice-by-mail requirement on its face 
does not substantially increase the burden on a personal repre- 
sentative and does increase the likelihood that heirs and devisees 
will be able to protect their interests, UUPC sections 3-306(2) and 
3-310(2) exhibit serious deficiencies. The sections fail to state 
what, if any, notice should be provided if the identity or address 
of an heir is unknown. UUPC section 1-401 states that when 
notice is required and the identity or address of a person is not 
known, notice by publication must be provided. Sections 3-306(2) 
and 3-310(2) fail, however, to indicate whether section 1-401 is 
applicable or what procedure should be followed in such circum- 
stances. Thus, under the UUPC, it is theoretically impossible to 
have an informal appointment proceeding if less than all the heirs 
and their addresses are identifiable. This represents a substantial 
departure from the UPC position that  informal appointment 
should ordinarily be available and that notice should seldom be 
required.97 Further, the delays inherent in identifying and locat - 
ing heirs so that notice can be mailed to them are incompatible 
with the UPC policy of speed and efficiency in distributing the 
estate. 
Three remedies to this problem are possible. First, Utah 
could amend sections 3-306(2) and 3-310(2) to require notice by 
UPC provides that the registrar may be either the judge or a person, including the clerk, 
designated by the court. UPC Q 1-307. 
93. UPC Q 3-302. 
94. UUPC Q 75-3-302 makes the 10-day notice requirement of 9 75-3-306 a prerequi- 
site to issuing the statement of informal probate. UUPC $0 75-3-307 and 75-3-310 apply 
the identical notice requirements to informal appointment proceedings. 
95. Straus, supra note 83, a t  871; see Fratcher, Estate Planning and Administration 
Under the Uniform Probate Code, 110 TRUSTS & ESTATES 5, 9 (1971). 
96. Straus, supra note 83, at  871. 
97. See UPC $ 5  3-301, -307 to -309, art. 111, General Comment. See generally Peter- 
son, supra note 82, a t  296. 
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mail only to known heirs a t  their last known addresses. Second, 
Utah could amend the sections to incorporate by reference the 
notice provisions of section 1-401.98 If that were done, however, 
the procedures for informal and formal appointment would be 
very similar.99 Hence, an attorney would always seek a formal 
appointment with its concomitant judicial protection.100 Finally, 
Utah could bring the UUPC into conformity with the UPC by 
eliminating the requirement of notice by mail. 
C. Part 6-Personal Representative: Appointment, Control and 
Termination of Authority 
Both the UPC and the UUPC provide that prior to receiving 
letters of administration, the personal representative must qual- 
ify by filing with the court "any required bond and a statement 
of acceptance of the duties of office."lol The UPC generally rejects 
the notion that bond should be required of a personal representa- 
tive unless excused by will.lo2 Instead, to protect against misman- 
agement of the estate by a personal representative, the UPC pro- 
vides that interested persons may: (1) make demand prior to 
notice of informal proceedings;lQ3 (2) contest a requested appoint- 
ment by use of a formal proceeding seeking the appointment of 
another person as personal representative;lo4 (3) block informal 
administration by filing a formal petition with the court;Io5 
(4) seek to have a restraining order entered against the personal 
representative;lo6 or ( 5 )  demand that the personal representative 
post bond.lo7 
Despite these UPC protections against mismanagement of 
the estate, Utah competely rejects the UPC's policy that bond 
ordinarily should not be required. UUPC section 3-603 requires 
bond unless: (1) it is waived by the will; (2) all the heirs file a 
98. It should be noted that UUPC § 75-1-401 embodies several changes from the 
provisions of the corresponding UPC section. 
99. Both would require that a petition be submitted to a district court judge. UUPC 
§ §  75-3-301, -201(36), -402. Both would also require that the § 1-401 notice requirements 
be met. UUPC 60 75-3-310, -403. 
100. See UUPC $0 75-3-412, -414. 
101. UPC 3-601. 
102. Id. § 3-603, Comment. 
103. Id. § 3-204. 
104. Id. $ 5  3-401, -603, Comment. 
105. Id. $8 3-105, -603, Comment. 
106. Id. 3-607. 
107. Id. 5  3-605. To be eligible foi 
least a $1,000 interest in the estate. 
this remedy, an interested person must have a t  
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written waiver; or (3) the court, acting on a petition for waiver 
accompanying informal or formal appointment, determines that 
bond is not necessary. The Utah section further provides that if 
no bond is initially required because all of the heirs have waived 
the requirement and it is later determined that other persons will 
be heirs, the personal representative must post bond unless he 
secures the additional waivers. 
While it is possible that a court may be willing to waive bond 
when requested to do so by the personal representative, the 
UUPC bond requirement has little merit. The Utah change re- 
flects the attitude that  the traditional requirement of bond 
should be preserved. The UPC safeguards surrounding the ap- 
pointment of a personal representative, such as the rights of inter- 
ested parties to challenge the appointment and request that bond 
be filed, seem more than adequate to protect interested parties 
without eliminating the UPC presumption that no bond is 
needed. 
The UUPC also differs from the UPC in the amount of bond 
required. The UPC provides for bond, when required, equal in 
amount to the estimated value of the decedent's personal estate 
plus the income expected from the personal and real property 
during the next year.lo8 In contrast, the UUPC requires bond 
equal in amount to the value of the decedent's personal property 
and real estate plus the income expected during the next year 
from real and personal property, but permits such amount to be 
reduced by the amount of secured claims against the property.log 
This change, even coupled with the Utah presumption requiring 
bond, causes no significant additional burden to the personal 
representative,l1° and provides added protection to interested par- 
ties. Although real estate cannot be disposed of in fraudulent 
transactions as easily as other types of assets, a bond will protect 
rightful distributees should the personal representative transfer 
the property to a bona fide purchaser for value. Therefore, al- 
though the change is inconsistent with the UPC's policy of sim- 
plicity and efficiency,lll the added measure of protection it af- 
fords may make it justifiable. 
Utah also alters the UPC prerequisite that an interested per- 
108. UPC § 3-604. 
109. UUF'C § 75-3-604. 
110. Bond is available for about $4 per $1,000 of bond desired. WESTERN SURETY 
COMPANY, BOND RATE MANUAL, at Jud-5 (Jan. 1975). Further, outstanding mortgages on 
the real property reduce the amount of bond necessary. 
111. See generally Robertson, supra note 83, at 7; Straus, supra note 83, at 871-72. 
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son or creditor have a $1,000 interest in the estate before he can 
demand bond. I l 2  The UUPC requires a $5,000 interest. I l 3  Utah's 
inclusion of this section is puzzling. The section provides that if 
bond has been excused under sections 3-603 or 3-604, even a 
$5,000 interest will not qualify a party to demand bond."' Since 
Utah starts with the presumption that bond is required unless 
excused, inclusion of a provision whereby interested parties can 
require the posting of bond unless the personal representative is 
excused is unnecessary. Only if Utah were to adopt the UPC 
presumption of not requiring bond would section 3-605 be neces- 
sary. 
UPC section 3-607(a), allowing any interested person to peti- 
tion the court for an order restraining a personal representative 
from taking action that would unreasonably jeopardize the inter- 
est of the applicant, has been retained in the UUPC. Utah has, 
however, added a clause that authorizes the court to order any 
person suspected of concealment or embezzlement to appear and 
account for such matters under oath.lI5 It is not clear whether the 
clause applies only to personal representatives, or to persons in 
general? This addition, although not suggested by the UPC, is 
compatible with the goal of streamlining the disposition of a dece- 
dent's estate. Utah courts can take jurisdiction of the few cases 
in which the questions of concealment or embezzlement arise and 
expedite the disposition process by determining whether the es- 
tate has been properly distributed. 
D. Part 7-Duties and Powers of the Personal Representatives 
UUPC part 7 differs in two major ways from the UPC. First, 
it restricts the power of the personal representative to sell prop- 
erty, and second, it provides a maximum fee schedule for com- 
pensating personal representatives and attorneys. As to the first 
difference, UPC section 3-704 provides that except for supervised 
administrations, the personal representative shall, without judi- 
112. UPC $ 3-605. 
113. UUPC $ 75-3-605. 
114. UUPC $ 75-3-605 indicates that: "the requirement [of bond] ceases if the 
person demanding bond ceases to be interested in the estate, or if bond is excused as 
provided in $ 5  75-3-603 or 75-3-604." 
115. UUPC $ 75-3-607(3). 
116. Since the clause is placed in the section entitled "Order Restraining Personal 
Representative," it would seem that the remedy applies only against personal representa- 
tives. However, the clause states that any person suspected of having concealed, etc., 
would be ordered to appear. Hence the ambiguity. 
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cia1 supervision, proceed expeditiously with settlement and dis- 
tribution of the estate. The corresponding Utah section creates an 
exception that prevents the personal representative from selling 
real property without court approval when an heir or interested 
person files a demand with the court.l17 The court, however, may 
approve such a sale upon petition by the personal representative, 
if proper notice has been given and a hearing held? 
This deviation, reflecting the approach of the previous Utah 
probate code,llg adds nothing but unneeded complexity to the 
UPC. An interested party challenging the distribution proposed 
by a personal representative under the UPC may do so by either 
contesting the appointment of the personal representativelZ0 or 
petitioning the court for supervised administration of the es- 
tate.lZ1 Further, the personal representative may be brought to 
account for any wrongdoing to interested persons.1z2 Any flexibil- 
ity gained by the Utah approach is negligible since the UPC 
allows judicial supervision of a single asset, if required by con- 
flicting interested parties,lZ3 and provides that a personal repre- 
sentative may be restrained in order to prevent unreasonable risk 
to an interested party.lZ4 Hence, Utah's additional requirement is 
excess baggage, adding little protection and increasing the likeli- 
hood of delays in administering the estate. 
One of the major differences between the UPC and the 
UUPC is found in UUPC section 3-718, which provides for com- 
pensation of personal representatives and attorneys. In contrast 
to the UPC, which states that personal representatives are enti- 
tled to reasonable compensation for their services,125 the UUPC 
establishes a fee schedule of maximum permissible charges? 
The inherent danger of the UUPC fee schedule is that fees pro- 
vided may come to be viewed as the norm, rather than the maxi- 
mum. The maximum fee suggested by the UUPC is even more 
likely to be viewed as the standard fee, since prior Utah law 
provided a mandatory compensation schedule for personal repre- 
117. UUPC $ 8  75-3-704, -710(2). 
118. UUPC $ 75-3-710(3). 
119. See UTAH CODE ANN. $ 5  75-10-2 to -4 (1953). 
120. UPC $$ 3-401, -603, Comment. 
121. UPC 0 3-502. 
122. UPC $ 3-703 states, in pertinent part, "A personal representative is a fiduciary 
who shall observe the standard of care applicable to trustees . . . ." 
123. See generally UPC $ 4  3-105, -603, Comment. 
124. UPC 8 3-607. 
125. Id. $ 3-719. 
126. UUPC 6 75-3-718. 
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~ e n t a t i v e s . ' ~ ~  Similarly, since many Utah attorneys previously 
operated under a court-approved minimum fee schedule,128 there 
is a danger that the UUPC maximum schedule will be used in 
much the same way. Recently, the United States Supreme Court, 
in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,129 struck down a real estate fee 
schedule as violative of section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act.lS0 The Court used an "effect on competition" test, stating: 
The record . . . reveals a situation quite different from what 
would occur under a purely advisory fee schedule. Here a fixed, 
rigid price floor arose from respondent's activities: every lawyer 
who responded to petitioners' inquiries adhered to the fee sched- 
ule, and no lawyer asked for additional information in order to 
set an individualized fee. 131 
If Utah lawyers and personal representatives rely heavily on the 
UUPC fee schedule, the practice proscribed in Goldfarb could 
develop in Utah. While there is some authority that an anticom- 
petitive marketing program created by a state legislature does not 
violate the Sherman this "state-action exemption" applies 
only to  situations where the  anticompetitive activity is 
compelled, not merely prompted "by direction of the state acting 
as sovereign."133 The UUPC fee schedule is not compulsory; 
hence, the legislative exception to the Sherman Act is not appli- 
cable. 
Regardless of whether the UUPC fee schedule and its con- 
comitant use violates the Sherman Act, the concept of such a 
127. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-11-25 (1953). 
128. The following fees previously were part of the rules of practice of the Third 
Judicial District, which includes Salt Lake City, Tooele, and Summit Counties: 
In decedent's estate, the following schedule of attorney's fees in a normal 
proceeding shall be allowed on the estate accounted for by the executor or 
administrator, as hereinafter defined: 
5Ci on the first $20,000.00 
4 5  on the next $40,000.00 
3 O i  on the next $140,000.00 
2 2 "i on the next $550,000.00 
2"( on the next $750,000.00 
1 1'; on the balance 
Minimum fee $250.00 
Utah Dist. Ct. R. 24 (Third Judicial District) (as of April 26, 1974). Subsequently a rule 
calling for a reasonable fee approved by the court was substituted. UTAH DIST. CT. R. 4.7 
(effective Jan. 1, 1976). 
129. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
130. 15 U.S.C. 9 1 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 15 U.S.C. 8 1 (1970). 
131. 421 U.S. a t  781. 
132. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
133. 421 U.S. a t  791. 
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schedule is alien to the intent and purpose of the UPC. Economy 
and efficiency of estate administration are not promoted by such 
schedules. More importantly, the enlightened view of probate 
fees is that they should reflect the complexity of the estate, the 
amount of time spent, and the degree of risk undertaken by the 
personal representative or attorney.134 Further, when the Utah 
legislature first considered the UUPC, the code did not contain a 
fee ~chedu1e.l~~ This suggests that the schedule is a concession to 
special interest groups rather than a rational departure from the 
UPC. 
The Utah statute varies slightly from UPC section 3-705 by 
not requiring the personal representative to give notice of his 
appointment to heirs and devisees. This is of little practical sig- 
nificance since UUPC section 3-302 requires a person seeking the 
position of personal representative to give notice of his appoint- 
ment.lJ6 Further, an heir or interested person, pursuant to section 
3-204, may demand notice of any probate proceeding. 
Another Utah deviation from the UPC occurs in the provi- 
sions of UUPC section 3-709, "Power to Avoid Transfers. "I3' Both 
codes give the personal representative the power to recover prop- 
erty transferred by the decedent in a transaction that is void or 
voidable as against the rights of creditors.13* The UUPC, however, 
adds that the personal representative is not required to bring such 
an action unless requested to do so by creditors, who must then 
pay the cost of litigation. This requirement effectively places the 
burden of collection on the real party in interest, and is 
commendable because it treats creditors as they would have been 
treated had the decedent lived, i. e., the creditors would have been 
forced to file suit to void such a transfer and would have been 
required to pay the costs of litigation themselves. The UUPC 
recognizes that there is no good reason to relieve creditors of these 
responsibilities when the debtor dies. 
E. Part 8-Creditors' Claims 
There are essentially two differences between the UPC and 
the UUPC in part 8. First, if notice has been published, the 
134. See Kabaker, Probate Fees- Where Are We Headed?, 46 N.Y .S.B.J. 577, 583- 
86 (1974); Hauptfuhrer, Variation in Probate Practices and Their Effects on Fees, 5 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 503, 506 (1970). 
135. See Giles & Miller, supra note 12, at 8.  
136. Note 91 and accompanying text supra. 
137. U U P C  $ 75-3-709; UPC 3-710. 
138. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. $ 25-1-3 et seq. (1953). 
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UUPC subjects claims against the estate, arising before or after 
the date of death, to a 3-month statute of limitations. The UPC 
provides 4 months.13"n addition, the personal representative 
may pay allowable claims against the estate beginning 3 months 
after death under the UUPC; he is obligated to wait 4 months 
under the UPC.140 The shorter statute of limitations and shorter 
waiting period before claims may be paid are minor changes. The 
second and more significant difference is found in section 3-805, 
"Priority of Claims." The UPC states that if the estate lacks 
sufficient assets to pay all claims, then claims should be paid in 
the following order: 
(1) costs and expenses of administration; (2) reasonable fu- 
neral expenses, and reasonable and necessary medical and hos- 
pital expenses of the last illness of the decedent, including com- 
pensation of persons attending him; (3) debts and taxes with 
preference under federal law or the laws of the state; (4) all 
other claims. 
In contrast, the UUPC provides that claims are to be paid in the 
following order: 
(a) Reasonable funeral expenses; (b) Costs and expenses of 
administration; ( c )  Debts and taxes with preference under fed- 
eral law; (d) Reasonable and necessary medical and hospital 
expenses of the last illness of the decedent, including compensa- 
tion of persons attending him; (e) Debts and taxes with prefer- 
ence under laws of this state; (f) All other claims.141 
The practice of giving funeral expenses first priority in payment 
is a vestige of prior Utah law.142 The rationale for the other UUPC 
changes is not apparent. 
Although the notice requirements of UPC section 3-801 were 
incorporated without change in the UUPC, they are worthy of 
comment. Utah, here, could profitably have deviated from the 
UPC approach in order to establish a more equitable system of 
notice to creditors. Section 3-801 of both the UPC and UUPC 
requires that notice be given to creditors if their claims are to be 
barred by the %month statute of limitations. Constructive notice 
by publication once each week for 3 consecutive weeks in a news- 
139. UUPC $$  75-3-802-03; UPC $ §  3-802-03. Section 75-3-801 also reflects this 
change by requiring that notice indicate that creditors must present their claims within 3 
months instead of 4. 
140. UUPC $ 75-3-807; UPC $ 3-807. 
141. UUPC $ 75-3-805. 
142. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 75-9-21 (1953) 
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paper of "general circulation" is sufficient. In contrast, section 1- 
401, governing notice of hearing on a petition, section 3-204, relat- 
ing to notice of any order or filing pertaining to property in which 
a person may have an interest, section 3-403, pertaining to notice 
of a hearing on formal testacy proceedings, and sections 3-1001 
and 3-1002, dealing with notice on closing of the estate, require 
that actual notice be furnished to creditors. Section 3-801, while 
adequate for dealing with unidentified creditors, is unsatisfactory 
for dealing with identifiable creditors. Although notice must be 
published in a newspaper of general circulation, few of the news- 
papers that specialize in publishing such notices are widely read 
by the public. Thus, while the large businesses who routinely 
scrutinize such publications may be protected, small business 
creditors may miss their opportunity to make a claim. Further, 
creditors who receive payments at  intervals of 3 months or more 
might have their claims barred without so much notice as a 
missed payment. Beneficiaries of the will or others interested in 
avoiding reduction in the size of the estate should not be permit- 
ted to cut off legitimate claims of known creditors in such a man- 
ner. 
In order to remedy this deficiency, both the UPC and the 
UUPC should be amended to require actual notice to known cred- 
itors and publication in a newspaper of circulation broad enough 
to reasonably reach unknown creditors. The burden imposed by 
requiring actual notice by registered mail or some other means is 
no greater than that imposed by other sections of the UPC.ld3 
Requiring notice to unknown creditors by publication in a news- 
paper calculated to reach most parties would grant such creditors 
a more reasonable opportunity to submit their claims. The bur- 
den imposed upon the estate to provide reasonable notice would 
be comparatively small. 
F. Part 9-Special ~ o v i s i o n s  Relating to  Distribution 
Chapter 9 of the UUPC contains a handful of minor changes. 
For example, whereas UPC section 3-914 provides that unclaimed 
assets escheat to a state treasury fund, Utah allocates such 
amounts to the state school fund.ld4 Deviation on this point was 
encouraged, however, since the UPC provision is contained in 
brackets. Also, the UPC creates an 8-year statute of limitations 
143. See, e.g., UPC $ 5  1-401, 3-204, -403, -1001, -1002. 
144. UUPC $ 75-3-914. See note 84 supra. 
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in determining whether qualifying persons may reclaim assets 
that have escheated to the state.ld5 In contrast, Utah provides no 
statute of limitations in such cases. 
Another minor difference is contained in UUPC section 3- 
916, "Apportionment of Estate Taxes." UPC section 3-916 de- 
fines "tax" as federal estate and state inheritance taxes. Utah 
uses the same definition, but adds that "tax" includes estate and 
other death taxes payable to the state. This change is insignifi- 
cant since Utah currently does not impose an estate or other 
death tax in addition to the state inheritance tax. 
G. Part 10-Closing Estates 
Both the UPC and the UUPC provide three methods for 
closing an estate. First, pursuant to section 3-1001, an estate may 
be closed by a formal adjudication after the requisite notice to all 
interested parties. Second, pursuant to section 3-1002, a testate 
estate may be closed in a formal proceeding with notice to the 
devisees. Res judicata protection is limited to the extent of the 
notice provided. Since only limited protection is available with 
section 3-1002, and the pleadings and proceeding required in a 
closing under sections 3-1002 and 3-1001 are substantially simi- 
lar, the attorney for the estate will ordinarily proceed under sec- 
tion 3-1001.14e Under the third method, section 3-1003, both the 
UUPC and the UPC provide that an estate may be closed upon 
a verified statement by the personal representative. When this 
method is used, Utah provides for a 4-month notice period in- 
stead of 6 months.14' Hence, the estate may be closed within 4 
months of notice of publication to creditors, instead of 6. 
Unfortunately, Utah has added language to section 3-1003 
that negates the advantages of the section. The purpose of the 
section is to provide a simple method of closing an estate when 
the personal representative does not anticipate an immediate 
need to protect himself from claims. The Utah change requires 
that all distributees of the estate consent in writing before the 
estate may be closed by a verified statement.148 Since the verified 
statement, when coupled with the consent requirement, requires 
nearly the same procedure as section 3-1002 and would provide 
145. UPC $ 3-914(b). 
146. Crapo, Account, Distribution and Closing of Estates, in IDAHO ESTATE 
ADMINISTRATION 359, 374 (P. Peterson ed. 1974). 
147. UUPC $ 75-3-1003. 
148. UUPC $ 75-3-1003(1). 
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essentially the same protection to the personal representative 
against claims by distributees who have consented, section 3-1003 
becomes redundant. Utah's section 3-1003 adds nothing to that 
which can already be accomplished under section 3-1002. The 
flexibility provided by UPC section 3-1003, however, is forfeited 
by Utah. 
Utah has also added that any accounting before closing the 
estate, required by sections 3-1001 through 3-1003, may be waived 
if all the distributees consent in writing. This modification of the 
UPC provides more flexibility. Distribution of the estate could be 
materially speeded under any of the pertinent sections if account- 
ing requirements were waived. However, the provision is not con- 
sistent with the UPC approach of providing different methods of 
closing an estate, each with different degrees of protection for the 
personal representative and distributees. By waiving the account- 
ing requirement, the effect of the three Utah sections becomes 
equivalent. Such an unstructured application of flexibility is 
undesirable given the availability of the orderly UPC approach. 
H. Part 12-Collection of Personal Property by Af idavi t  and 
Summary Administration Procedure for Small Estates 
In section 3-1201, both the UPC and the UUPC provide that 
an estate consisting only of personal property of limited value 
may be transferred to a successor without the need to appoint a 
personal representative. In addition to other  requirement^,'^^ the 
UPC limits the applicability of this section to estates having a net 
value of less than $5,000. In contrast, Utah permits application 
of the section to estates of up to $10,000. This change is compati- 
ble with the UPC since it permits a greater number of estates to 
be speedily and efficiently distributed. 
The Utah legislature should be commended for adopting a 
probate code similar to the UPC. Generally, the UUPC promotes 
the UPC policy of providing a simplified, flexible method of ad- 
ministering estates. Many of the changes Utah has incorporated 
into the UUPC, however, are unfortunate. For the most part, they 
reflect Utah's unwillingness to move from its traditional ap- 
proach to the more efficient approach of the UPC. In many in- 
149. UPC §§ 3-1201(a)(2) to (4); UUPC § §  3-1201(l)(b) to (d). 
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stances, Utah's revisions are unnecessary, suggesting a lack of 
understanding of the implications of the UPC system; in some, 
the work of special interest groups is apparent. It is hoped that 
the Utah legislature will take advantage of the time available 
before the UUPC becomes effective to review the wisdom of its 
deviations from the UPC and make the Utah probate system 
more harmonious with the policies pursued by the UPC. 
